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Retrospective pledge voting: A comparative study of the electoral
consequences of government parties’ pledge fulfilment
THERES MATTHIEß
Manifesto Research on Political Representation (MARPOR), Research Unit ‘Democracy and
Democratization’, WZB Berlin Social Science Research Center, Germany
Abstract. Does pledge fulfilment bear any electoral consequences for government parties? While previous
research on retrospective voting has largely focused on electoral accountability with respect to the economy,
the theoretical framework presented in this study links government parties’ performance to their previous
electoral pledges. It is argued that government parties are more likely to be rewarded by voters when they
have fulfilled more pledges during the legislative term. Good pledge performance of a party is associated
with the ability to maximise policy benefits (accomplishment) and to be a responsible actor that will stick to
its promises in the future as well (competence). Analysing data from 69 elections in 14 countries shows that
a government party’s electoral outcome is affected by its previous pledge performance.A government party
that fulfils a higher share of election pledges is more likely to prevent electoral losses. This finding indicates
that voters react at the polls to party pledge fulfilment, which highlights the crucial role of promissory
representation in democratic regimes.Surprisingly and in contrast with economic voting, there is no evidence
that retrospective pledge voting is moderated by clarity of responsibility.
Keywords: retrospective voting; pledge fulfilment; representation
Expanding retrospective voting to pledges
Does pledge performance bear any electoral consequences for government parties?
There can be significant variability in government party pledge performance. The British
Conservatives, in government between 1987 and 1992, kept more than 90 per cent of their
pledges. In contrast,only 24 per cent of the policy commitments of the right-wing FPÖ,which
became the second strongest party in theAustrian elections in 1999 and entered government
for the first time in a coalition with the conservative ÖVP, were enacted by the end of the
legislative period in 2002. This study investigates whether citizens consider this difference
in performance for their voting choices.Do government parties have to fear electoral losses
if they give a poor performance?
This article builds upon four major strands of literature: research on election pledge
fulfilment, on citizens’ perceptions of pledge fulfilment, on retrospective voting, and on
prospective voting. Only in recent years have scholars started to give serious thought
towards using government performance as a record of fulfilment of promises made by
parties in their electoral programs, and to study differences across countries and under
different institutional arrangements (Naurin et al. 2019). Of course, political scientists have
been interested before in promissory dimensions of democratic accountability (Mansbridge
2003), and have empirically studied the linkage between electoral programmes and policies.
Research on saliency has analysed the congruence between a party’s relative emphasis
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on topics in its electoral program and the subsequent budgetary expenditures in this area
(Klingemann et al.1994).The pledges approach offers amore detailed analysis of the linkage
between electoral programs and outputs. Election pledges are “commitments in parties’
programs to carry out certain policies or achieve certain goals” (Thomson et al. 2017, 528).
Thus, the pledges approach focusses on specific parts of a party’s electoral programme,
prospective policy commitments (and not all statements in a manifesto), and depending
on the content of the pledge associates them with different sources, such as legislation,
ministerial decrees, or budgetary issues. The empirical results of Thomson et al. (2017) have
shown that while parties’ electoral promises are not “cheap talk”, not all of them are kept.
Scholars have also recently started to analyse how voters perceive pledge fulfilment.
Admittedly, the narrative of pledge breaking politicians appears to be firmly anchored in
society (Naurin 2011, 69–98). However, beyond this broad assessment of the general ability
and willingness of any politician and party to keep previously made pledges, voters appear
to be better informed about concrete pledge performances of government parties.Different
scholars have provided evidence that citizens’ perceptionsmirror actual pledge performance
(Thomson & Brandenburg 2019; Duval & Pétry 2018; Thomson 2011).
Research on retrospective voting has provided a wide range of evidence that voters
consider parties’ and politicians’ past behaviour for their voting decisions. Many scholars
have studied the status of the economy as a predictor of voting choices (Lewis-Beck&Ratto
2013;Fiorina 1981;Key 1966). It appears that elections are instruments through which voters
reward incumbents for good economic performance, and punish them for bad economic
performance. There is also some evidence that voters consider government performance in
other policy fields beyond the economy, such as internal security, for their voting decisions
(Cook et al. 1994; Cummins 2009;Marsh & Tilley 2010).
Previous research has also provided a wide range of evidence for prospective voting:
voters care for parties’ policy positions and specific proposals offered in election campaigns
(Downs 1957;Budge & Farlie 1983;Hsieh et al. 1998;Elinder et al. 2015). Prospective voting
models consider competition between political parties, assume that election platforms are
binding for the political parties and that citizens vote in accordance with their expected
utility regarding the policies that a party supports in its platform.
This study aims to bridge these different perspectives on government performance and
voting. I analyse retrospective pledge voting at the aggregate level, as many economic voting
studies have done (Nannestad & Paldam 1994; Paldam 1991; Powell & Whitten 1993). In
contrast to economic voting however, the notion of performance used in this study does
not rely on an abstract, universal economic condition such as the GDP, unemployment,
or inflation, but links an incumbent party’s own promised policies to the actual output.
The main difference between my approach and economic voting relates to how voters
attribute responsibility for outputs and outcomes to parties. For economic voting, voters
themselves must attribute responsibility to government parties. The economy is a very
complex phenomenon: it is not only political parties that are involved but many different
players, such as companies, interest groups and other states. Thus, when responsibility is
not clearly attributed a priori to one of these actors, deciding which of these players to
make responsible for a bad state of the economy is a very difficult task and it is inevitable
that different people attribute responsibility to different actors.1 From the perspective of
retrospective pledge voting, however, parties declare themselves responsible for different
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policies and outcomes.Thus, retrospective pledge voting naturally establishes a link between
expectations which have been created by a party itself by making promises to its voters, and
the actual delivery of these promises during its time in government.2
This is the first study that analyses electoral consequences of government party pledge
fulfilment from a comparative perspective. Up until now, the very few scholars who have
studied the effect of pledge fulfilment or breakage on voting have either conducted
experiments in controlled laboratory conditions (Feltovich & Giovannoni 2015; Born et al.
2018) or relied on empirical evidence in specific countries or regions (Elinder et al. 2015;
Johnson & Ryu 2010). The results of these studies have been mixed: while the experimental
scholars have found evidence that pledge breakage leads to electoral punishment of a
candidate, the authors of the empirical studies – that have only focussed on specific countries
and single economic pledges – have not found any support for retrospective pledge voting.
This study examines electoral consequences of pledge performance of government parties
beyond the economy, in various policy fields, in 14 different countries.
I argue that voters do not forget about a government party’s previous election pledges
and react to this party’s record of fulfilment of pledges at the following election. This is
to be expected because of two mechanisms: first, the enactment of pledges implies policy
benefits (rewarding accomplishment), and second, government parties that do stick to
their pledges during the legislative term are perceived as credible and accountable actors,
and consequently voters will trust them in the future as well (attributing competence).
The results of the comparative analysis indeed indicate that a government party’s pledge
fulfilment affects its electoral outcome. Thus, it appears that government parties worsen
their chance of being re-elected if they do not stick to what they promised their voters during
the previous election campaign. However, interestingly and in contrast to economic voting,
retrospective pledge voting is not more likely to emerge when clarity of responsibility is
high.
This study is a first step towards improving the understanding of citizens’ voting
considerations by linking a prospective and retrospective perspective on voting.The findings
pave the way for a better understanding of citizens’ voting considerations with regards
to promissory democratic representation (Mansbridge 2003). Especially in times of rising
populist parties who challenge existing democratic structures and criticise established
parties for not being responsible actors, it is essential to understand how citizens evaluate
and react to parties’ actual performances.A notion of performance that is based on election
pledges acknowledges that the relation between representatives and represented goes
beyond rational benefits and is also about trust. Trust is necessary to ensure that voters
actually feel represented by their representatives – and the role of election promises in this
relation should not be underestimated (Rose & Wessels 2018).
Retrospective pledge voting
Rewarding accomplishment and attributing competence
I argue that election outcomes depend on a government’s past performance in fulfilling
election pledges. This study incorporates the Comparative Party Pledges Project’s concept
of highly specific pledges. It defines an election pledge as “a statement committing a party
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Figure 1. Stages from pledge-making to voting.
Note: The figure shows the single stages from pledge making to voting in order to illustrate the theoretical
assumptions and causal mechanisms as explained in the main text. The focus of this study is to analyse the
link of pledge fulfilment to voting at the aggregate level, as indicated by the bigger, dark grey boxes.
to one specific action or outcome that can be clearly determined to have occurred or
not.” (Thomson et al. 2017, 532).3 I refer to the ability (or willingness) of a government
party to enact its election pledges as pledge performance. I propose that the better a
government party’s pledge performance, the better its electoral outcome is expected to be
at the next elections. The theoretical perspective of this study builds upon the established
model of retrospective voting at the aggregate level, as has been suggested by economic
voting scholars who see electoral outcomes as a result of general economic performances
(Nannestad & Paldam 1994; Paldam 1991; Powell & Whitten 1993). However, this study
widens the traditional perspective on retrospective voting by linking election outcomes to
specific performances of individual government parties.
Based upon a rational choice approach of individual action (Downs 1957), I assume
voters to be rational actors and policy-seekers who consider policies supplied by parties in
the form of election pledges. They care for pledges when they are made and also scrutinise
how well incumbent parties keep their pledges during the legislative term. Thus, I assume
that voters do not forget about election pledges, but consider how well a government party
has performed in fulfilling its pledges, and are more likely to reward that party at the next
election when it has shown a better pledge performance.
There are several steps in the causal chain between pledge fulfilment and voting, as
illustrated in Figure 1. To begin, we have to go back in time. Consider Party A, offering a
policy program and making pledges during an electoral campaign at t0. These pledges are
perceived by citizens, who decide based on the content of these pledges whether they want
to vote for party A at t1. Party A then receives sufficient votes to enter government. During
the legislative term (t2), A fulfils or breaks its electoral pledges. Its pledge performance
is perceived by citizens who attribute responsibility to A. Finally, citizens cast a vote at
t4 and decide, based on A’s pledge performance at t2, either to reward or punish it by
maintaining or withdrawing their vote.4 Before elaborating on the causal mechanisms of
rewarding accomplishment and attributing competence that link pledge performance and
voting (the variables that this study is mainly interested in), I will briefly go through the
different steps of this chain in order to elaborate on the underlying assumptions that are
inherent to retrospective pledge voting.
The first two steps preceding pledge performance are pledge-making and perception of
pledges. During election campaigns, parties compete with each other by offering different
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policy proposals that are written down in their electoral programmes. They emphasise
different issues (Wagner &Meyer 2014), and promise different policy actions and outcomes
to their voters (Ferguson 2012, 67; Royed 1996, 56–59;Wagner & Meyer 2014).
When it comes to perception of pledges, of course most citizens do not read the electoral
programmes of all competing parties. However, research has suggested and shown that
media reports the content of electoral programmes to citizens (Bara 2005; Merz 2018), and
that citizens indeed consider different political offers as made in electoral programmes for
their voting decisions (Budge & Farlie 1983; Downs 1957; Hsieh et al. 1998; Elinder et al.
2015). In addition, the way pledges are defined by the Comparative Party Pledges Project
implies high specificity – and specific pledges are much more likely to be identified as core
policies by voters, and a party’s success (or failure) to enact specific pledges is more likely to
be accurately perceived by voters (Naurin&Oscarsson 2017, 6).Thus, it can be assumed that
electoral platforms and the pledges contained in them play a crucial role during electoral
campaigns and affect a party’s chance to maximise its votes when citizens are attracted by
its policy proposals.
After a party has been voted into government office, it is expected to stick to its promises
during the governing period (t2). The idea of linking policies in electoral programs to actual
policy outputs and outcomes has been manifested in the mandate theory, the responsible
party model and in the concept of promissory representation (Mansbridge 2003;McDonald
& Budge 2005; Klingemann et al. 1994). Citizens consider pledge fulfilment as one of the
most crucial qualities of good governing behaviour, and the abandonment of pledges leads
to great distrust in political parties (Rose & Wessels 2018). Empirically, electoral programs
do indeed predetermine the legislative agenda to a large extent. However, there still is a
variance between governments in their ability (orwillingness) to stick to their pledges during
the legislative term (Thomson et al. 2017). The government setting clearly affects a party’s
ability of fulfilling its original election pledges. For example, being in a coalition makes it a
priori more difficult for a party to enact its election pledges when compared with a single
party government. Usually, coalition partners write a coalition agreement at the beginning
of the legislative period which to a large degree sets their governing agenda (Timmermans
2003; Moury 2011).5 In line with that, pledge scholars have found that election pledges
that are supported in the coalition agreement are more likely to be enacted (Mansergh &
Thomson 2007;Matthieß 2019). However, even if on average the share of pledge fulfilment
is lower for parties in coalitions when compared with single party governments, there still
is considerable variation within each of these groups. In the empirical sample used in this
study, pledge fulfilment of single party governments empirically ranges from 45 to 92 per
cent and for coalition parties from 23 to 83 per cent. Consequently, I assume that voters
react to different performances given by parties in coalitions – although it might be to a
lesser degree when compared with parties in single party government, as will be elaborated
below (H2).
Perception of pledge performance and attribution of responsibility link the two main
steps – pledge performance and voting – to each other. In general, there appears to be
a negativity bias with respect to citizens’ evaluations of parties’ abilities and willingness
to fulfil their pledges (Naurin 2011, 69–83). However, despite this general negativity bias,
citizens still perceive differences in pledge performance.Research that has more thoroughly
looked into evaluations of pledge performance – perceptions of the overall rate of pledge
C© 2020TheAuthors.European Journal of Political Research published by JohnWiley&SonsLtd on behalf of EuropeanConsortium for PoliticalResearch
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fulfilment as well as the enactment of single pledges – has demonstrated that citizens’
accurate evaluations of pledge fulfilment depends significantly on the actual performance
of government parties. These studies have shown “that people hold far more nuanced and
accurate views on promise keeping and breaking than suggested by their responses to
general questions” about whether political candidates or parties generally stick to their
election pledges (Thomson & Brandenburg 2019, 25). General questions about whether
political parties keep their pledges might actually be a measure of political trust rather than
a way to evaluate citizens’ knowledge about actual pledge fulfilment (Naurin & Oscarsson
2017, 3). Of course, how people perceive and evaluate political information in general
(Simon 1955;Campbell et al. 1960, 133;Evans &Andersen 2006) and pledge performance in
particular, might be moderated by their prior beliefs (Belchior 2019; Markwat 2014; Duval
& Pétry 2018). Belchior (2019) has argued and shown for Portugal that people who do
not sympathise with the government and who identify with an opposition party are more
likely to be biased in judging actual fulfilled pledges as broken. But, this is not necessarily
inconsistent with my argument: voters who identify with and/or voted in a previous election
for a government party are expected to be better at accurately evaluating that party’s pledge
performance. Thus, even if there might be a general negativity bias in evaluations of pledge
performance (e.g. 50 per cent of actual pledge fulfilment might generally be perceived as
only 40 per cent), I assume that citizens who generally identify with a government party still
do perceive different levels of congruence between specific promises and outcomes (that
empirically range from23 per cent to over 90 per cent) and are able to attribute responsibility
to the party in question – and this ultimately affects their voting decisions.6
Turning now to the main causal mechanism of this study: how does pledge fulfilment
influence voting? I argue that a party’s pledge performance affects its chances of being
re-elected in at least two different ways. The first one involves the idea of rewarding
accomplishment. This argument builds upon the established theory of retrospective voting
used by economic voting scholars who see elections as instruments with which voters reward
or punish governments on the basis of past economic developments (Key 1966; Fiorina
1981). The perspective of rewarding incumbents based on their performance is expanded
to individual government parties that, as I argue, are held accountable according to the
congruence between their formerly made policy propositions in various policy fields during
the electoral campaign and the policies implemented during the legislature. It is worth
taking another look at Figure 1 which traces the path from pledge-making to voting. As
has been argued above, voters decide to vote for the party who is closest to their own
preferences for a past election at t1 (Downs 1957). Policy proposals made at t0 are expected
to satisfy these voters’ personal desires. Since voters are policy-seekers, the enactment
of these pledges maximises their utilities. Thus, when the party they supported enters
government after the election, they expect that partywill stick to the policy proposals offered
during the electoral campaign and will translate them into actual policies and outcomes
during their time in office. At the next election at t4, voters look back and reward their
party by re-electing it if it has fulfilled its pledges. Equally, they punish it for failure by
withdrawing their support and electing a competitor (or abstaining from the election).
Thus, according to this first scenario of rewarding accomplishment, citizens’ voting decisions
are based on backwards-looking reasoning: past achievements are rewarded on the day of
election.
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The second causal mechanism that I present here refers to the idea of attributing
competence to a party. In this scenario, voters are not only assumed to look back and reward
or punish a party according to its past performance, but also look to the future and use
the past performance that a government party has shown as a source of information. In
this way, they select competent officials who will continue to run for office over the long
term (Ferejohn 1986). Building upon the idea of prospective voting, when electing a party
at t4, voters must choose based on the offer of different policy proposals (Downs 1957), and
in doing so take a leap of faith. But how can they be sure that the party that they have
elected will not forget about its election pledges after entering government? A valuable
source of information for deciding whether to trust someone in the future is past experience.
Competence and trust are essential qualities of political candidates that are considered by
citizens for their voting decisions.Abramowitz (1988) has emphasized the increasing role of
candidate characteristics, since the “weakening of party loyalties in the electoratemeans that
candidates must increasingly rely on personal appeal to gain votes” (398). In particular, it
appears that incumbents lose significant support when their involvement in political scandals
is revealed to the public (Abramowitz 1988;Krosnick & Kinder 1990; Peters &Welch 1980).
Thus, a government party that has shown good performance by sticking to its promises
during t2 is perceived as a competent and responsible actor, and voters will trust that this
party will be committed to its promised policies in the future as well. Equally, voters will
be sceptical when a party has not kept the promises upon which it was elected into office
in the first place. A party suffers from credibility problems with respect to holding future
commitments when it has strongly deviated from its past policy agenda and has shown
fundamental ideological shifts – voters will not perceive this party as a competent actor, lose
trust, and consequently, withdraw their support at the polls even if they do not oppose the
party’s new electoral program at t3. Thus, in this second scenario of attributing competence,
citizens employ forward-looking reasoning for their voting choices: based upon on a party’s
past performance, an evaluation can be made as to whether that party is a competent and
trustworthy actor that is expected to stick to promises in the future as well, and should
therefore be supported at the polls.
Both perspectives, rewarding accomplishment and attributing competence, are plausible
mechanisms that link pledge performance to voting. They might be valid at the same
time, and thus are not mutually exclusive. For example, voters might simultaneously be
forward- and backward-looking: they want to support party A at the polls because they are
pleased with its past performance, and at the same time they can be certain that the party’s
new program will be implemented as well. This study does not aim to disentangle both
mechanisms. What is essential here is that there are at least two mechanisms that provide
reasonable arguments as to why pledge performance affects voting.
I expect that voters decide whether to support a party in future elections based
on its previous pledge performance. The sum of these individual decisions is then
expected to be observable at the aggregate level, which is reflected in election
results.
Hypothesis 1: The better a government party’s pledge performance, the better its
electoral outcome.
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Clarity of responsibility
The previous arguments were based on the assumption that voters are rational, policy-
seeking actors. This assumption implies that voters are always equally well informed about
outcomes of policy-making-processes, and that they all apply the same reasoning when
judging an individual party’s ability and willingness to keep its pledges – independently of
the context.However, there is a wide range of various government and institutional settings
that might decrease the chance that voters accurately perceive information about pledge
fulfilment andmake strict judgments about a government party’s pledge performance.Thus,
under certain conditions, such as higher levels of complexity in policy-making, a citizen’s
rationality might be bounded or affected by other conditions when taking retrospectively
informed voting decisions (Powell & Whitten 1993; Hobolt et al. 2013).
The concept of clarity of responsibility is best suited to describe these distortions in
rational decision making that arise from complex institutional and government settings
(Powell & Whitten 1993). As has already been argued above, the government setting,
such as sharing power in a coalition, appears to affect a government’s ability to enact
its election pledges at t2. It is not just that multiple veto players in the government
make the policy making process more complex due to the necessity of negotiating and
compromising (Tsebelis 2002), but also that citizens are expected to have difficulties in
accurately perceiving and encoding political information, such as pledge performance,
when compared to situations in which only one party is in charge of the government.
Various scholars have argued and shown that for economic voting if power is unified in
the incumbent government, citizens are more likely to place responsibility for outcomes on
incumbents (Powell & Whitten 1993, 398). According to Hobolt et al. (2013), there are two
forms of clarity: institutional clarity refers to the formal, relatively static division of power
within a country that is, among other things, determined by the governmental system and
the existence of institutional veto players, such as second chambers. Governmental clarity
concerns the cohesiveness of an incumbent government at a given time, which can change
within a country, e.g. coalition versus single party government or minority versus majority.
As is the case with economic voting, I expect that retrospective pledge voting is moderated
by clarity of responsibility at the institutional and government level. Voters are more likely
to perceive pledge fulfilment and hold parties accountable when lines of responsibility are
clear.
Clarity of responsibility might moderate the relation between pledge performance
and voting in two ways: first, voters face challenges in accurately perceiving information
about pledge fulfilment. If lines of responsibility are blurred because a minority coalition
government is formed, it becomes more difficult to receive information and make an
accurate evaluation of a government party’s performance when compared to a situation
where a single party government with a securedmajority in parliament exists.A government
party with less power and fewer seats has greater difficulties in communicating its policy
positions to voters than a party withmore seats and power (Spoon&Klüver 2017).Similarly,
it can be expected that voters are more likely to perceive the achievements of a single-
party majority government than of a government party in a minority coalition, who has
to find compromises with its coalition partner and additionally depends on the support of
opposition parties.
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Second, even if voters were fully informed about a party’s pledge performance,
institutional and governmental settings might affect the attribution of responsibility: voters
might realise that a party’s ability to successfully enact its program depends on the existence
of other veto players, such as coalition partners, that make it necessary to agree on
compromises, and consequently to break pledges. In such situations, it is expected that
voters are more lenient in their judgments. Empirically, it is difficult to disentangle whether
the conditioning effects emerge during the stage of accurate perception or attribution of
responsibility. However, for the purpose of this study it is important that blurriness in
lines of responsibility is expected to weaken the effect that a government party’s pledge
performance has on citizens’ voting decisions.
Hypothesis 2: The higher the clarity of responsibility, the more likely that a government
partywith a better pledge performancewill improve its electoral outcome.
Research design
Case selection
This study examines the effect of pledge performance across 14 countries and 69 elections
between 1977 and 2015. The country selection includes Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, France,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands,New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. Table A1 lists all included governments.
Using this comparative sample allows for analysis of the electoral consequences of
pledge fulfilment in different institutional and governmental settings – thereby increasing
the confidence in the external validity of the findings. For example, there is variation
between countries with respect to institutional features such as unicameralism and
federalism. Federal, bicameral countries such as Germany as well as unitary, unicameral
systems such as Sweden are considered in this study. In addition, the governmental
settings differ both between and within countries: in Ireland, for example, single-party
executives with and without legislative majorities, as well as minority and majority
coalitions, have been formed. The variation in institutional and government features
will be considered in the analysis by controlling for different degrees of clarity of
responsibility.
Measuring electoral outcome
The dependent variable is operationalised in three different ways: change in vote share,
absolute vote share and vote ratio.Change in vote share is an establishedmeasurement in the
economic voting literature (Powell &Whitten 1993;Paldam 1991). Incumbent gains or losses
are calculated by subtracting the percentage of valid votes won by each government party
in the current election by the percentage in the previous one.Data source for calculating the
dependent variable is the Manifesto Project Dataset (Volkens et al. 2017). On average, the
vote share is -0.05. Thus the government parties considered in this study suffer a 5 per cent
vote share loss on average.7 The absolute vote share is measured by the percentage of votes
won by the government in a current election at t2 (Lewis-Beck & Mitchell 1990).Vote ratio
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is calculated as the incumbent gains or losses by dividing the percentage of valid votes won
by each government party in the current election (t2) by the percentage in the most recent
one (t1).
Measuring pledge performance and clarity of responsibility
The main independent variable, pledge performance, is operationalised as the share of
election pledge fulfilment for each government party and is calculated by dividing the
number of fulfilled pledges by the number of total pledges for each party. The data are
extracted from the large-scale comparative analysis of election pledge fulfilment assembled
by scholars from the Comparative Party Pledges Project – CPPP (Thomson et al. 2017).
According to the CPPP’s definition a pledge is “a statement committing a party to one
specific action or outcome that can be clearly determined to have occurred or not”
(Thomson et al. 2017, 532). This means that in order to be identified as a pledge, an
electoral commitment is required to have specificity, so that a researcher can find clear
evidence for its fulfilment. After a pledge has been identified, a second coding step
consists of determining its status of enactment. Document sources for deciding whether
a pledge was fulfilled include legislation, ministerial decrees, and budgetary, as well as
secondary sources. In order to ensure high quality data, the CPPP has conducted several
coder reliability tests for both coding stages, within and between countries (see online
appendix).
The data for France and New Zealand are added from country studies conducted by
Bouillaud et al. (2017) and McCluskey (2008) who have applied a similar coding procedure,
as suggested by the CPPP, when gathering their data. However, since these data have not
been part of the CPPP’s project and there is no information about the coder reliability, I will
also run analyses without these countries in order to ensure that my results are not driven
by deviating coding procedures.
Figure 2 shows that there is variance in pledge performance across the cases that are
included in this study. The average share of pledge fulfilment at the party level is 60 per
cent. The lowest rate is 23 per cent (Irish Green Party in a coalition with two other parties,
2007–2011),and the highest 92 per cent (Swedish SocialDemocrats in a single partyminority
government, 1994–1998). There are countries in which parties have constantly higher rates
of pledge fulfilment, such as the UK (78-92 per cent), and other countries such as Austria
(24-58 per cent) where government parties generally show lower rates of pledge fulfilment.
However, as the box plots by country in Figure 2 show, there is also substantial variation
within countries.
In order to test H2, this study measures clarity of responsibility. As has been proposed
by Hobolt et al. (2013), I also consider clarity of responsibility as a two-dimensional
concept, incorporating institutional and government clarity. I use the identical components
for measuring institutional clarity as in Hobolt et al. For government clarity I make slight
adjustments which allow, as I argue below, measuring this dimension more precisely for the
purpose of this study.
As in Hobolt et al., this study measures institutional clarity by considering four
components: weak committee structures (1 for weak, 0.5 for middle strong, and 0 for
strong committees),8 unicameralism (1 for uni- and 0 for bicameralism), unitarism (1 for
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Figure 2. Distribution of pledge fulfilment by country.
Note: Boxes are ordered by the country median of the share of pledge fulfilment from high to low.
unitary and 0 for federal state), and parliamentary system (1 for parliamentarian and 0
for (semi-)presidential).9 The assigned values are added up and then divided by four –
the number of components. The index has an observed maximum of 1 and a minimum
of 0.
For government clarity, the following components are considered: single party vs.
coalition government (1 vs. 0), a government’s majority status (1 for majority vs. 0 for
minority government), non-existence of bicameral opposition (1 for non-existence and
0 for existence), and ideological cohesion within the government (continuous measure:
1 for maximum cohesion, 0 for minimum distance).10 Ideological cohesion is calculated
by considering variation between ideological positions: it is measured as the ideological
distance between the leftmost and rightmost parties in coalitions, using the positions on
a left-right-dimension as indicated by the Manifesto Project Dataset (Volkens et al. 2017)
and rescaled to run from 0 to 1. In single party governments, ideological cohesion is coded
as 1. Finally, the assigned values for a government’s coalition status, its majority status,
the existence of bicameral opposition and ideological cohesion within a government are
added up and divided by four. Empirically, the index for government clarity runs from 0.46
to 1.
C© 2020TheAuthors.European Journal of Political Research published by JohnWiley&SonsLtd on behalf of EuropeanConsortium for PoliticalResearch
12 THERES MATTHIEß
Measuring control variables
I include three control variables which might possibly confound the hypothesised
relationships. First, I consider a country’s economic situation by controlling for the average
economic misery. The Economic Misery Index (EMI) goes back to the economist Arthur
Okun (Okun 2011). It is calculated by adding the unemployment rate to the inflation rate
(percentage change in the Consumer Price Index). For each legislature, I considered the
mean of the unemployment and inflation rate between the years of two elections. The log
of the variable is used in order to account for the EMI’s skewed distribution. The EMI is
chosen over other economic measures such as the GDP because it includes two aspects,
unemployment and inflation, and these are much more likely to be perceived by citizens
because they are more directly affected than by changes in the GDP. However, in order to
account for the use of different economic measures in models of retrospective voting, I also
estimate models as robustness checks that include alternative economic measures, such as
the average GDP growth.
In addition, I control for confounding effects at the party level: a government party’s
vote share of a past election and its distance to the median position. In line with previous
studies, the past vote share is expected to be negatively related to incumbent gains, because
“it is easier to lose absolute percentage points from a larger base” (Powell & Whitten
1993, 395f). The distance to the median position is included in order to control for citizens’
prospective voting considerations at t4. The smaller the distance to the median position at a
current election, the more likely a government party is expected to gain votes (Downs 1957).
The distance is calculated by subtracting a government party’s rile score as it appears in
the Manifesto Project Dataset (Volkens et al. 2017) from the median position. The absolute
distance is divided by 100 so that it could theoretically range from 0 (occupation of the
median position) to 1 (highest distance to median position). Empirically, it ranges from 0.01
to 0.47.
Analysis
In order to empirically test the formulated hypotheses about retrospective pledge voting, I
rely on OLS regression models. The observations are clustered into countries and therefore
all models have been estimated with clustered robust standard errors. First, I investigate
the effect of pledge fulfilment on voting (H1). Second, I test whether retrospective
pledge voting is moderated by clarity of responsibility at the institutional and government
level (H2).
Table 1 reports the full results of the estimated regression models. There are three
different measures for the dependent variable that capture a government party’s electoral
outcome: change in vote share (A), the absolute vote share (B), and vote ratio (C). Each of
the models 1 includes pledge performance as the main independent variable and controls
for the economic situation as well as the distance to the median position. The results of the
models 1.A-C show that pledge fulfilment has a positive and statistically significant effect on
the electoral outcome. Higher levels of pledge fulfilment appear to be of advantage for the
electoral support of a government party.Thus, the results indicate that the electoral outcome
is positively affected by pledge fulfilment, as has been suggested by H1.
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Figure 3. Effect of pledge fulfilment on electoral performance.
Note: The figure is based on model 1.A in table 1. Grey area indicates 95% confidence intervals.
Based on model 1.A, Figure 3 illustrates the predicted values of pledge fulfilment on the
change in vote share. All other variables are held at their mean. The point estimates of the
predicted values are indicated by the solid lines and the 95 percent confidence intervals are
illustrated by the grey area.The figure shows that the electoral performance of a government
party steadily improves with the pledge performance.A government party that enacts 50 per
cent of its election pledges would have to fear losing seven per cent of its votes,while a party
that reports a pledge fulfilment rate of 80 per cent would lose two per cent of votes from one
election to another. Thus, there is a tendency to lose rather than win votes for government
parties at subsequent elections – this has been also suggested and shown by previous studies
(Whitten & Palmer 1999; Paldam 1986). Nevertheless, this predication is in line with H1: a
government party shows a better electoral performance when it has shown a better pledge
performance.11
Now looking at models 2.A-C and the impact of clarity of responsibility that has been
shown by previous studies to be a crucial moderator of retrospective economic voting.
For voting based on pledge performance, however, the story seems to be different. For
both clarity measures negative – albeit not statistically significant – interactions terms are
reported.Higher clarity does not appear to make retrospective pledge voting more likely to
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occur. Thus, clarity of responsibility does not show the expected effect, which is yet another
indication that retrospective pledge and economic voting differ from each other in some key
aspects.
With regard to the control variables in Table 1: as expected and in line with previous
studies, the vote share of a past election is negatively related to changes in vote share - it
is easier to lose votes from a larger base. Only in the models 1.B and 2.B a positive effect
is reported: the vote share in the previous election (lagged dependent variable) appears to
positively impact the current absolute vote share. But this is not surprising: for example, a
party that gained 30 per cent of votes at t1 might lose votes at a subsequent election, but is
still more likely to receive 25 per cent of votes at t2 when compared to a party that had a vote
share of 5 per cent at t1.As expected, the economicmisery index (EMI) shows a negative and
(apart from models 1/2.C) statistically significant impact on an incumbent party’s electoral
performance. The effect for the distance to the median position is positive (as expected) in
the model variants A and B, but negative in C, but in all models it is neither substantial in
size, nor statistically significant.
In order to validate the findings, different robustness checks have been performed.
All of these additional models can be found in the appendix.12 First, the models have
been re-estimated without France and New Zealand which have not been coded by the
CPPP (Bouillaud et al. 2017; McCluskey 2008). Table A2 shows that the results do not
substantially differ when these cases are excluded. Second, table A3 considers the clarity
measures as additional controls for testingH1 (model 1) and different variants of interaction
effects for testing H2: a separate test for government (model 2.1) and institutional clarity
(model 2.2) as well as for the difference between single vs. coalition party governments,
which is one component of the government clarity index (model 2.3). Regarding the latter:
studies that have been interested in pledge fulfilment as dependent variable have shown
that pledges originating from single party governments are more likely to be fulfilled when
compared with coalitions (Thomson et al. 2017).However, retrospective pledge voting does
not appear to be affected by this difference. The remaining checks in table A3 also do not
differ substantially from the results that have already been presented in Table 1. For both,
institutional and government clarity,negative and not statistically significant interactions are
still reported. In sum, all additional robustness checks do not contradict the main findings
of the analysis above.13
The results of the analysis lend considerable support for the hypothesis that pledge
fulfilment affects electoral outcomes: a government party appears to be less likely to lose
votes when it has shown a better performance at pledge fulfilment. Different measures of
electoral success – changes in vote share, vote ratio and absolute vote share – have been
considered in the analysis and the results have been shown to be robust. However, there is
no evidence that retrospective voting with respect to pledge performance is more likely to
occur when clarity of responsibility at the institutional and government level is high.
Conclusion
Does pledge performance bear any electoral consequences for government parties? I find
that electoral outcomes of government parties depend on their performance of pledge
fulfilment. This study has looked at the relation between pledge performance and voting at
C© 2020TheAuthors.European Journal of Political Research published by JohnWiley&SonsLtd on behalf of EuropeanConsortium for PoliticalResearch
16 THERES MATTHIEß
the macro level, which can be considered as a hard test. As I have argued, there are several
intermediate steps between pledge fulfilment and voting which might present challenges
when looking at the direct link between pledge and electoral performance of a government
party. However, despite these challenges, this study finds evidence that voters do respond
to government party pledge fulfilment. Government parties are not rewarded for pledge
fulfilment, but it appears that they are able to prevent bigger electoral losses if they show
better performances in keeping their pledges.The general tendency of government parties to
lose rather than win votes at subsequent elections has also been shown by previous studies
(Paldam 1986; Whitten & Palmer 1999). But obviously, electoral losses can be prevented
if government parties meet their own standards and voters’ expectations. Thus, the main
finding of this study is that pledge performance matters for voting.14
I do not find conclusive evidence that institutional and government clarity of
responsibility moderates the relation between pledge performance and voting. This is
surprising because clarity of responsibility has been shown to be a crucial moderator of
economic voting (Hobolt et al. 2013; Powell & Whitten 1993). Thus, it seems that pledge
performance and economic voting differ from each other in some key aspects.
My findings have important implications for research on voting, pledge fulfilment and
citizens’ evaluations of pledge fulfilment. First, retrospective voting considerations do
matter – beyond the economy. Citizens appear to be able to consider differences in party
pledge fulfilment, and to hold government parties accountable for promises that were
made in the past. Moreover, if as this study has shown there is a direct effect of pledge
performance on voting,political parties should be aware of the long-term costs that they risk
when election pledges are ignored. A party that consistently disregards its own guidelines
will neither be regarded as a responsible nor as a competent player to which voters are
willing to delegate power. Second, the findings of this study add empirical evidence to the
normative ideal of promissory representation that has guided research on pledge fulfilment
(Mansbridge 2003; Thomson et al. 2017; Naurin et al. 2019). Parties should take their own
pledges seriously, because voters obviously do not forget about them. Or said the other
way around: if voters do indeed punish or reward political parties at elections for bad or
good pledge performances respectively, then parties should have an incentive to keep their
electoral pledges (Aragonès et al. 2007), and be careful when they make pledges. Knowing
that voters do not forget about past elections puts pressure on parties to be truthful and
not to try to bait voters with unrealistic promises. Third, this study has incorporated the
perception of pledge fulfilment as a crucial step between pledge performance and voting
in its theoretical assumptions. Even if there is a general negativity bias with respect to how
people perceive pledge fulfilment (Naurin 2011;Thomson 2011),actual differences in pledge
performance still appear to result in different electoral outcomes – at least at the aggregate
level. Thus, it appears that voters do not only expect (Rose & Wessels 2018), but also react
to party pledge fulfilment.
This study serves as a crucial step towards understanding the linkage between pledge
performance and voting, though the results do raise interesting questions for future studies
to answer.One puzzling finding is that high levels of clarity of responsibility do not positively
impact pledge performance based voting. In addition, future research should look into
the relation between pledge performance and voting not only at the aggregate level, but
especially at the level of individual voters. This would allow a closer look at the causal
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mechanisms that are assumed to link pledge performance and voting to be taken. One
interesting question to address in future research is, for example, whether different kinds
of voters react differently to party pledge fulfilment.
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Appendix
Table A1. Country and government selection
Single-party executives with legislative majorities (23 governments)
Bulgaria 1997-2001, ODS
Canada 1993-1997, Liberals; 1997–2000, Liberals; 2000–4, Liberals; 2011–15, Conservatives
France 2007-2012, UMP
Ireland 1977-81, Fianna Fáil
New Zealand 1972-5, Labour; 1978–81, Nationals; 1981–4, Nationals; 1984–7, Labour; 1987–90, Labour;
1990–3, Nationals; 1993–6, Nationals
Portugal 2005-9, PS
Spain 1989-93, PSOE; 2000–04, PP
UK 1974-79, Labour; 1979–83, Conservative; 1983–87, Conservative; 1987–92, Conservative;
1992–97, Conservative
United States 1977-81, Democrats
Single-party executives with legislative minorities (16 governments)
Bulgaria 2009-13, GERB
Canada 2004-6, Liberals; 2006–8, Conservatives; 2008–11, Conservatives
Ireland 1987-89, Fianna Fáil
Portugal 1995-99, PS
Spain 1993-96, PSOE; 1996–2000, PP
Sweden 1994-98, Social Democrats; 1998–2002, Social Democrats; 2002–6, Social Democrats
United States 1981-85, Republicans; 1985–89, Republicans; 1989–93, Republicans; 1993–97, Democrats;
1997–2001, Democrats
Coalition executives with legislative majorities (25 governments)
Austria 2000-3, ÖVP/FPÖ; 2003–7, ÖVP/FPÖ; 2007–8, SPÖ/ÖVP; 2008–13, SPÖ/ÖVP
Bulgaria 1995-96, BSP/NS; 2001–5, NDSV/DPS; 2005–9, BSP/NDSV/DPS
Germany 2002-5, SPD/ Greens; 2005–9, CDU-CSU/ SPD; 2009–13, CDU-CSU/ FDP
(Continued)
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Table A1. Continued
Ireland 1982-87, Fine Gael/Labour; 1989–92, Fianna Fáil/Progressive Democrats; 1992–94, Fianna
Fáil/ Labour; 2002–7, Fianna Fáil/Progressive Democrats; 2007–11, Fianna Fáil/
Progressive Democrats/ Greens; 2011–16, Fine Gael/Labour
Italy 2001-6, Berlusconi II’s coalition (FI/AN/LN/UDC/NPSI/PRI); 2008–11, Berlusconi IV’s
coalition (PdL/LN/MpA/PID)
Netherlands 1986-89, CDA/VVD; 1989–94, CDA/PvdA; 1994–98, PvdA/VVD/D66
New Zealand 1996-9, Nationals; 1999–2002, Labour; 2002–5, Labour
Sweden 2006-10, Moderate Party/Centre Party/People?s Party/Christian Democrats
Coalition executives with legislative minorities (4 governments)
Ireland 1997-2002, Fianna Fáil/Progressive Democrats
Italy 1996-98; Prodi I’s Ulivo coalition (PDS/PPI/RI/FdV/UD); 2006–8, Prodi II’s coalition
Unione (DS/DL/PRC/RnPPdCI/IdV/FdV/UDEUR)
Sweden 2010-14, Moderate Party/Centre Party/People’s Party/Christian Democrats
Source: Thomson et al. (2017b), except for New Zealand (McCluskey 2008) and France (Bouillaud et al.
2017) that are written in italics.
Table A2. The effect of pledge fulfilment on electoral performance – w/o FRA and NZL
DV: vote share Model 1 Model 2
Pledge performance 0.150** (0.049) 0.444 (0.292)
Institutional clarity – 0.106 (0.114)
Inst. clarity*PP – −0.317 (0.213)
Government clarity – 0.089 (0.333)
Gov. clarity*PP – −0.109 (0.524)
Previous vote share −0.207* (0.085) −0.238** (0.085)
Distance median 0.014 (0.053) 0.027 (0.062)
EMI (log) −0.026*** (0.007) −0.019. (0.011)
Constant −0.006 (0.055) −0.169 (0.228)
Observations 80 80
R2 0.238 0.303
Adjusted R2 0.197 0.225
Notes:Results from anOLS regression with clustered robust standard errors. PP – pledge performance,EMI
– Economic Misery Index. New Zealand and France are excluded.
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, p < 0.1.
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Table A3. The effect of pledge fulfilment on electoral performance – clarity of responsibility
DV: vote share Model 1 Model 2.1 Model 2.2 Model 2.3
Pledge performance 0.182*** (0.052) 0.287*** (0.061) 0.457 (0.287) 0.165. (0.087)
Institutional clarity −0.039 (0.032) 0.085 (0.052) – –
Inst. clarity*PP – −0.194 (0.077) – –
Government clarity −0.002 (0.035) – 0.250 (0.22) –
Gov. clarity*PP – – −0.400 (0.356) –
Single party – – – 0.141 (0.094)
Single party*PP – – – −0.152 (0.156)
Previous vote share −0.220** (0.080) −0.218** (0.072) −0.213* (0.083) −0.303***(0.077)
Distance median 0.016 (0.047) 0.016 (0.049) 0.044 (0.057) −0.005 (0.053)
EMI (log) −0.021. (0.011) −0.023* (0.009) −0.025** (0.009) −0.028*** (0.007)
Constant −0.013 (0.049) −0.072 (0.055) −0.199 (0.203) 0.012 (0.082)
Observations 92 92 92 92
R2 0.252 0.262 0.247 0.287
Adjusted R2 0.200 0.209 0.193 0.236
Notes:Results from anOLS regression with clustered robust standard errors. PP – pledge performance,EMI
– Economic Misery Index. The variable “single party” is coded a dummy (1 – single party government, 0 –
party in a coalition).
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, p < 0.1.
Online Appendix
Additional supporting information may be found in the Online Appendix section at the end
of the article:
Table 5. The effect of pledge fulfilment on electoral performance – alternative economic
control variables
Table 6. The effect of pledge fulfilment on electoral performance – PEC
Table 7. The effect of pledge fulfilment on electoral performance – w/o distance median
Supporting Information
Notes
1. See for example Marsh and Tilley (2010) who have shown that only when citizens attribute credit or
blame to the government, evaluations of the economy (and also other policy fields such as health)matter
for their voting decision.
2. With respect to the relation between pledge performance and the economy: Pledge fulfilment appears
to be affected by economic growth. However, this does not mean that a good pledge performance
is the same as a good economy. These are theoretically and empirically distinct phenomena, and as
Thomson et al. (2017, 539) have shown, “the effect [of economic growth on pledge fulfilment] is not
consistent throughout the subset of cases” that they and I use. Consequently, even if economic voting
and retrospective pledge votingmight have theoretical and empirical similarities, they are not equivalent.
3. Before the CPPP scholars agreed on a common pledge concept, some of the scholars involved had
previously supported a broader definition of pledges in their own case studies. One reason to agree on
the narrow definition of pledges was for the purpose of comparison across countries. From a theoretical
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point of view, I follow the scholars who support a narrower pledge definition. They “believe that the
mandate model of representative democracy is about parties that tell voters what they would do and
how they would do it if they enter government office. […] responsible parties must set out their plans
in detail.” (Thomson et al. 2017, supporting information). Empirically, I expect that parties are more
concrete andmake specific policy offers about issues that are salient to them and their voters.Moreover,
they can be clearly identified as pledge breakers if they do not stick to their specific pledges, whereas
there is more room for interpretation with respect to more vague and ambiguous pledges (Dolezal et al.
2018, 243; Ray 2007, 17). For more information, see online appendix.
4. Pledge-making at t3 is part of the full theoretical chain and is therefore illustrated in Figure 1.
Theoretically, it is incorporated in the causal mechanism of “attributing competence” that is presented in
the main text. Though, it has to be noted that this study mainly builds upon a retrospective perspective
on voting and consequently, does not seek to test how voters weigh prospective against retrospective
considerations.
5. Legislative agendas that are more like short-term agreements than coalition agreements and are
especially important for minority governments appear to largely pre-determine the legislative agenda
(Klüver and Zubek 2018; Osnabrügge 2015).
6. Even if there might be other random errors and biases at the individual level, such as lack of political
sophistication, they are expected to cancel each other out at the aggregate level (Erikson et al. 2002).
7. One observation had to be dropped because the Irish Progressive Democrats who entered the
government in 2007 dissolved before the next elections in 2011.
8. I add “0.5” as a middle category. Hobolt et al. have only considered weak (“1”) and strong committees
(“0”).
9. I use Thomson et al. (2017)’s categorisation of (semi-)presidential systems.
10. This composition of the government clarity index deviates slightly from Hobolt et al.’s proposition who
originally included the following items in their index for government clarity: the dominance of one party
(head of government party’s share of cabinet posts), single party government, absence of cohabitation
and a government’s ideological cohesion (Hobolt et al. 2013).For more information on howmymeasure
of government clarity deviates from Hobolt et al.’s, see online appendix.
11. Marginal effects (pledge performance on change in vote share) have also been calculated based on
model 2.A. The results provide evidence for H1: the electoral performance of a government party
steadily improves with its pledge performance.
12. The models that are reported in the appendix consider the change in vote share as dependent variable
(model variant A in Table 1). The checks have also been performed when vote ratio or absolute vote
share are considered as dependent variables. Since the results do not substantially change, I only report
the results of model variant A for the purpose of clear presentation.
13. Additional robustness checks are reported in the online appendix, e.g. with alternative economic
measures and PECs as controls. The results of the variables of interest do not substantially change.
14. Though this study cannot fully prove that the theoretical chain presented in this paper is the only
plausible explanation for why there is a relation between pledge performance and voting. Two
alternative mechanisms could be: First, voters might rely on experts and the public opinion who might
be better informed about the actual pledge fulfilment than individuals are (Erikson et al. 2002). Second,
even if voters do not keep track of every single pledge, they might still perceive when a party deviates
from its general ideology – which can be associated with pledge breaking. However, at least from a
theoretical point of view,pledge breaking is not identical to ideological shifting: theremight be situations
in which parties stick to their general ideology (e.g. more welfare state expansion), but do not stick
exactly to those specific policies that were promised before elections (e.g. no increase in childcare
benefits as had been promised, but instead more money for hospitals which had not been promised).
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